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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE C. LUNDEBERG and
JOYCE R. LUNDEBERG, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
WALTER K. DASTRUP and MRS.
WALTER K. DASTRUP, his wife,
Defendants, Counter-Claimants
and Cross-Claimants,
ALYCE H. HUSBANDS,
Cross-Defendant and Cross-Claimant,
JOHN L. REEDER and MRS. JOHN
L. REEDER,
Cross-Defendants.

Case No.
12625

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an Appeal from an Order granting a Motion
to recall an Execution and vacating an Order directing
the Sheriff to proceed with an Execution Sale.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On the 28th day of February, 1964, the Honorable
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C. Nelson Day, Judge of the District Court, in and for
Iron County, State of Utah,
a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure which vv>as filed by the Clerk of that
Court on l\,farch 3, 1964 (Tr. 67). Paragraph 4 of the
Decree recited "Th3.t the Plaintiffs be and they are hereby awarded judgment against the Defendants in the sum
of $500.00 for Plaintiff's attorney herein." In March of
1971, Plaintiff c,'l_used to be issued an Execution against
the property which was subject to the lien created by the
Judgment. After two attempts on the pa!·t of the Plaintiff and refusal to carry out the Execution by the successor in interest of one of the Defendants, Alyce H. Husbands, :Niel.: Caravelli, the Court o:tdered the Sheriff to
forthwith proceed with the sale and the costs of the sale
vvere transmitted by the Plaintiff to the Sheriff, with the
posting of the Notices and the advertising of the sale,
and three days before the sale, the Court heard a Motion
on the part of the Sheriff of Iron County, and the successor in interest of the Defendant, Alyce H. Husbands,
to recall the Execution and vacate the previous Order
directing the Sheriff to forthwith proceed. It is from
this Order, dated the 20th of July, 1971, and signed, J.
Harlan Burns, District Judge, (Tr. 81), Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff's Judgment is still on the record and has not
been satisfied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON THE RULING
This Appeal asks this Honorable Court to reverse
the ruling of the Trial Court, granting the Motion to recall the Execution and vacating the Order directing the
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Sheriff to proceed with the Execution Sale. Plaintiff further asks this Court to order the District Court to forthwith proceed with the execution and sale to satisfy the
Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October, 1949, one ALBERT MITCHELL, JR.
and his wife were then the owners of certain property in
Parowan, Iron County, Utah, upon which they had
erected a motel and restaurant. They thereafter executed
a uniform contract of sale to A. C. HUSBANDS and
ALYCE H. HUSBANDS, his wife. Mr. Husbands later
died and the contract was thereupon vested in Mrs. Husbands, his wife. Later the Mitchells sold the title to the
property to one SHELDON BREWSTER and wife, who
in turn assigned and conveyed the title to the Plaintiffs,
WAYNE C. LUNDEBERG and JOYCE B. LUNDEBERG. The plaintiffs and appellants herein hold the
legal title to the property conveyed by their deed of conveyance. In turn, Mrs. Husbands sold on a contract to
WALTER K. DASTRUP and wife, who in turn assigned
their interest to JOHN L. REEDER and wife. At the
commencement of this action as set forth in Plaintiff's
Complaint (Tr. 1), W. K. DASTRUP and his wife were
in possession and had failed under the contract to make
payments to the Plaintiff. After due and proper notice,
Plaintiffs commenced an action for unlawful detainer
against W. K. Dastrup and his wife. The Defendant in
turn filed answer counter-claim and cross-claim (Tr. 7)
against Alyce H. Husbands and John L. Reeder and his
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wife. The substance of their claim was that the land
which they had purchased under the contract from Mrs.
Husbands was not properly described by metes and
bounds; that there was a substantial overlap into the
highway and upon the property of the City of Parowan.
The Court then, over the objection of the Plaintiffs, permitted the Defendant, Alyce H. Husbands, through her
attorney, J. Grant Iverson, who is now deceased, to
amend and correct any discrepancies in the title. The
Court, by its Decree, granted to the Plaintiff an Execution and Writ of Restitution, and the further sum of
$500.00 attorney's fees.
The Court in this same action and by the same Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (Tr. 50) awarded to the
Cross-Defendant, Husbands, a Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure, foreclosing the interest of Dastrups and
Reeders, and quieting the title to all other persons in the
chain of title or who claimed an interest by virtue of a
real estate contract or assignment, subject, however, to
the prior claim and title of the Lundebergs. The Court
also awarded to the Cross Defendant, Husbands, a Decree
of Foreclosure to satisfy the claim of the Husbands.
Thereafter, a Sheriff's sale was held to satisfy said judgment and claim of the Defendant, Husbands, in the sum
of $15,524.57, and the Execution and sale were promptly
carried out thereafter (Tr. 52). Plaintiffs, however, retained the title and its award of $500.00 for attorney's
fees for the use and benefit of Plaintiff's attorney, which
judgment became a lien upon the real property.
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The Defendant, Husbands, then continued payments
on the contract and in accordance with the terms of the
original contract made by Husbands to Mitchell and
under which contract the Mitchells transferred title to
the Lundebergs, down and until some time in the latter
part of 1970 when Mrs. Husbands sold and transferred
her i..--iterest to one Nick Caravelli, who is now in possession of the premises, and the successor in interest of Mrs.
Husbands. At the time of the sale, Plaintiff, who had
waited seven years, made demand for the payment of the
$500.00, together with the interest at the legal rate from
the time of the entry of the Judgment. At this point Mr.
Iverson was then deceased, and the present owner, Caravelli, and his attorney, ignored Plaintiff's requests and
demands. Plaintiff thereupon caused to have issued an
Execution out of the District Court and the Sheriff, who
was friendly with the said Caravelli, refused to proceed
with the sale. Plaintiff then moved the Court for an
Order requiring the Sheriff to forthwith proceed with the
sale and execution. This Order was heard and granted
in July, 1971 (Tr. 76). Plaintiffs' counsel thereupon
mailed costs in the sum of $80.00 to the Sheriff of Iron
County to advertise the sale of the property which was
done. Approximately five days before the date of the
sale on the 15th day of July, 1971, and after notices had
been posted and advertisement made, the Court heard
arguments on a Motion of the Sheriff and Caravelli to
vacate the Order heretofore made and entered, directing
the Sheriff to proceed with the Execution Sale (Tr. 52).
Aftert he arguments, the Court took this matter under

ti

advisement and on the 20th day of July, 1971, one day
before the date of the sale, granted the Motion of the
Sheriff and Caravelli who was the successor in interest
of Alyce H. Husbands, and the sale proceeded no further.
The Judgment has not been satisfied. Hence this Appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
THE MOTION TO RECALL THE EXECUTION AI'-TD VACATING THE ORDER DIRl:::CTING THE SHERIFF TO PROCEED
WITH THE EXECUTION SALE.
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (Tr. 50,
Par. 4) recites "That Plaintiffs be and they are hereby
awarded Judgment against Defendants in the sum of
$500.00 for Plaintiffs' attorney herein." That paragraph
is very clear and there are no exceptions or variances in
its language.
Later in Paragraph 7, it is true that the title is "de
creed quieted against the claims of all parties to this
action except the prior claim of the Lundebergs".
It was argued in the lower Court that Husbands were
innocent bystanders, and were made parties to this action
only as cross-defendants. Counsel wants to distinguish
them from ordinary Defendants.

,-

The answer to this proposition is simply that Plaint _f brought an action for unlawful detainer to regain
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r;o ;;:.:e:.::::ilon of the prope.rty because oi the failure of peri;,1 pos2e:::s:ion to pr.y under the real estate contract.
All oi. the contracts, together will all of the assignments,
contai!1ed a provision for the pc>.yment of attorney's fees
in case the parties thereto failed on the contract. This
HY:m'd ran '.Vith the land and was and is a lien thereon.
H?_d it bs8n the intention of the Court to except from the
for attorney's fees, the Husbands, the Judgmsnt, and D2cree would most certainly have so stated.
Althcugh Husbands were drawn into the suit by a crossdaim (Tr. 10), had this not occurred, the outcome of
t1L:: ·;u:t v;culd h2 the S2-..'1.1e as far as the Lundebergs were
c::r1:::e:med. Possession would have been restored to Plaint:;h 2nd the awoxd of attorney's fees made in accordance
the ten.8s cf the real estate contract.

The Lower Court in its Order granting Defendants'
It-:ctjon to Recall the Execution and Vacating the Order
directing the Sheriff to proceed with the Execution Sale
(Tr. 81) stated "and it further appearing to the Court
that the Plaintiffs were not granted and do not have a
ji_:drrment for any sums against Alyce H. Husbands and
that all other rights having been extinguished thereunder".
There is nothing in the record to substantiate this
conclusion on the part of the trial Judge. The statement
in the original Judgment and Decree (Tr. 50), that Plaintiff have Judgment of $500.00 against Defendants for attorney's fees is very plain and needs no added interpie-
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tations. The Judgment became and is now a lien on the
property and runs against all of the defendants.
Paragraph 8 of said Decree recites that the Husbands' lien may be foreclosed and the premises sold at a
public auction by the Sheriff of Iron County. The Decree
recites that the Cross-Defendant, Husbands, or any party
to this action may become the purchaser at the sale.
Judgment is awarded in the amount of $15,524.57, together with 6% interest from October, 1961, and $500.00
attorney's fees and Husbands' costs and disbursements
incurred, and "if any deficiency remains, the Sheriff shall
specify the amount thereof in his Return of Sale and a
Deficiency Judgment shall be entered in this action in
favor of Husbands against the Dastrups".
It is clear by the Sheriff's Return which counsel has
offered (Tr. 62) that the Defendant and Cross-Claimant,
Alyce Husbands, bid in this property at the Sheriff's Sale,
subject, of course, to the interest of the Plaintiffs. Ever
since said time, Mrs. Husbands has, and at the present
time the present owner and occupant, one Caravelli, has
paid on the contract to the Plaintiffs, Wayne Lundeberg
and Joyce Lundeberg, his wife, the sum of $150.00 per
month. If the sale foreclosed all the other judgments,
then there is really no need for Mrs. Husbands or her
assignee to continue making the $150.00 per month payments. However, he doesn't claim that, but he claims
it foreclosed only part of it, to-wit, $500.00 attorney's fees
awarded to Plaintiff.
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It is well settled that an execution purchaser ac-

quires such estate or interest and only such estate or interest as the execution debtor had, taking merely a quit
claim of the execution debtor's title. See 30 Am. J. 2d,
p. 692, §430.
"Under this rule, if the judgment debtor had no
interest in the property, the execution purchaser
acquires no interest therein. The rule prevails even
if a larger interest in the property was intended
to be sold. The execution purchaser is regarded
as knowing the limitations on the sheriff's power,
and buys what the sheriff can sell, and no more.
Similarly, the general rule is that the execution
purchaser acquires by his purchase every right
which the debtor had with regard to the property,
and, as a general rule, is not entitled to any advantage in regard to the property purchased which
the execution debtor did not have."
In Reynolds vs. Reynolds, 355 Pac. 2d 481 (Cal.),
the Court held that all that the Sheriff could validly
transfer at an Execution Sale was the right, title, and
interest of the debtor and through such a sale creditor
can acquire such interest as a debtor has then and no
more.
In the present case, Mrs. Husbands, at the sale,
bought in the interest that she had in satisfaction of her
Judgment against the Cross-Defendants, to-wit, Dastrup
and Reeder. No attempt was ever made on her part to
claim a foreclosure of Lundebergs' interest or any part
thereof. How it could be said at this time that the sale
did not disturb the interest of Lundebergs but only the
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internst of Lundebergs' Judgment for attorney's fees begs
reason.
In LeGrande vs. Russell, 126 Pac. 2d 136 (Cal.):
"Judgment creditor takes no better title to property than
his judgment debtor had."
Again, in Rabbit vs. Atkinson, 113 Pac. 2d 14 (Cal.):
"A purchaser of real estate at the execution sale acquires
only such interest as the judgment debtor had in the
property."
We submit that Mrs. Husbands never had nor did
she ever claim an interest greater than Lundebergs', and
the sale was only as to the interest which she had in the
property, and should Dastrup or Reeder have come in
and redeemed under the sale, this still would not affect
the interest and title of Lundebergs.
Again, in 33 C. J. S., p. 570, §287 (Execution) we
submit the following:
The doctrine of caveat emptor applies to execution
sales, and, subject to certain exceptions, the pur·
chaser takes whatever title the execution debtor
has, no more and no less.
Except where fraud intervenes, the rule is well
settled that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies
to execution sales, and that purchasers thereat
must take notice of the title for which they bid,
thus there is no implied warranty of title. How·
ever, where there is an express warranty as to the
quantity of property on sale, the doctrine of caveat
emptor does not apply as to quantity.
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Subject to the exceptions considered later in
this subdivision, the purchaser under a valid execution sale takes just what title or interest defendant in the execution has, no more and no less;
and, except insofar as he may have the right to
redeem, see §253 supra, the defendant loses all
the title and internst he had in the property. 'I'hus
the purchaser at an execution sale, even though
in good faith, acquires no title where the judgn1ent
debtor had none, as where he transferred it before
the lien of the judgment attached to it.
The contention that a sheriff's sale is analogous to a sale in market overt, and that for that
reason a purchaser takes title to property sold
thereat, although the debtor had none, has been
explicitly repudiated. The sheriff's deed of bargain
and sale executed by the debtor would pass. In
other words, the sale operates as a conveyance of
the title which the debtor was capable of conveymg.
It is held that a purchaser at a sheriff's sale
on execution acquires no better title than the judgment creditor would have received had he purchased, or than the judgment creditor could give
if he were allowed to seize the property and sell
it by virtue of his judgment without an execution.
Where the judgment creditor purchases the property, the general rule applies, and he acquires only
the actual interest of the debtor; and if the debtor
is the purchaser, he acquires no new title.

In this case it cannot be said that Mrs. Husbands
was a bona fide purchaser for value. She knew of the
details of the suit and she knew the interest that she had
acquired thereby, and she most certainly did not acquire
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a better interest than she already had, by virtue of the
Sheriff's sale. See Pender vs. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265
Pac. 2d 644.
Again, in Sarkeys vs. Russell, 309 Pac. 2d 723
(Okla.), "A purchaser at a Sheriff's Sale is not an innocent purchaser and he takes only such interest as the
judgment debtor possesses. If the judgment debtor has
nothing, the purchaser acquires nothing."
Also, see Harvey vs. Whyte, (Cal.) 323 Pac. 2d 162:
"The rule of caveat emptor applies to execution sales and
the purchaser at such sale is chargeable with notice that
he acquires no better title than the judgment debtor had
and he cannot recover from the levying officer because
of any defect in title."
In Rexburg Lumber Company vs. Purrington, 113
Pac. 2d 511, 62 Idaho 461, the Court held: ('Where an
execution creditor who purchases at his own sale merely
credits on his judgment the amount of the purchase price
instead of paying the money, he is not a 'bona fide' purchaser, because he has parted with nothing."
This last quotation from the Idaho Court seems to be
a uniform rule of law throughout all of the jurisdictions,
and the Plaintiff, respectfully submits that there is no
variance as to this rule of law. Mrs. Husbands, by the
sale merely foreclosed the interest of the other Defendants and in no way disturbed the judgment rendered in
favor of the Plaintiffs and against her and all other De·
fendants.

,
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The mere fact that there were two facets to this
Decree, in which a judgment was made in favor of the
Plaintiff and in favor of one Defendant and Cross-Claimant against the others should give the Court no problem
and is certainly a means used universally and provided
by law and our statute and rules of civil procedure to
avoid a multiplicity of suits.
If counsel's position were correct, that the sale

cleaned out the $500.00 attorney's fee awarded to the
Plaintiff, it would also clean out any other interest that
the Plaintiff had and the title would have vested in Mrs.
Husbands and she would have no reason to continue to
pay any money to the Plaintiffs as she has done and as
Caravelli as her successor in interest is now doing.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they are entitled
to have the Judgment heretofore made and entered by
the original Judgment and Decree satisfied in its entirety;
that this Honorable Court reverse the ruling of the District Court and order the execution and sale of the property in order to satisfy and discharge Plaintiffs' Judgment
for attorney's fees. This matter should therefore be remanded to the District Court with appropriate instructions.
Respectfully submitted,

LA MAR DUNCAN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants

